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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Robert Michael Williston timely appeals from the district court's judgment of
conviction. On appeal, Mr. Williston argues that the district court abused its discretion
when it denied his motion to withdraw his guilty plea. Specifically, he argues that his
guilty plea was not entered knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily, because he was not
informed about the intent element of attempted strangulation prior to the entry of his
guilty plea. Alternatively, Mr. Williston argues that his lack of knowledge as to the intent
element of attempted strangulation constituted a just reason to withdraw his guilty plea
and the district court abused its discretion when it denied his motion because the State
failed to allege that it would be prejudiced in the event Mr. Williston was allowed to
withdraw his guilty plea.

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
Mr. Williston and his wife, Sheri Williston, were drinking alcohol at their place of
employment when they decided to return to their home.

(R., p.10.)

The couple

continued to drink alcohol after arriving at their home. (R., p.10.) Ms. Williston made
some comments which angered Mr. Williston, and he started slapping her in the face.
(R., pp.10-11.) Mr. Williston stopped hitting Ms. Williston after he noticed that she was
bleeding.

(R., p.11.)

According to Ms. Williston, Mr. Williston also choked her.

(R., pp.10-12.) According to Mr. Williston, he only slapped her. (R., pp.10-11.) The
following morning, Ms. Williston called the police. (R., pp.10-12.)
Mr. Williston was charged, by information, with felony domestic battery and
attempted strangulation. (R., pp.34-35.) Mr. Williston met his court appointed attorney
a few minutes prior to his arraignment in the district court. (10/04/13 Tr., p.16, Ls.19-23;
1

03/24/14 Tr., p.33, Ls.6-10.) 1 At the arraignment, Mr. Williston decided to accept a plea
agreement offered by the State, wherein Mr. Williston pleaded guilty to attempted
strangulation, and, in return, the State dismissed the domestic battery charge and
agreed to forgo filing a persistent violator enhancement.

(R., pp.40-41; 10/04/13

Tr., p.11, Ls.22-25.) After Mr. \Nilliston was sworn in at the arraignment/entry of plea
hearing, the district court asked him to look at Count I of the information and said, "It
alleges that on August the 29th of 2013 here in Kootenai County, it says that you
willfully and unlawfully choked or attempted to strangle a person by the name of Sheri
Williston.

Is all of that true?"

(10/04/13 Tr., p.20, Ls.5-9.)

Mr. \Nilliston said yes.

(10/04/13 Tr., p.20, L.11.) Instead of requesting a factual basis for the guilty plea, the
district court said, the information "describes how you did that -- and I'm not sure we
need to go over that -- but the important part is that it says that you were household
members at the time of this action. Is that true as well?" (10/04/13 Tr., p.20, Ls.12-16.)
Mr. Williston said that was true, and the district court accepted Mr. Williston's guilty plea.
(10/04/13 Tr., p.20, Ls.18-22.) At no point in time did the district court seek to have
Mr. Williston confirm that he placed his hands on his wife's neck.

(See generally

10/04/13 Tr.)
The sentencing hearing was continued on various occasions.2 (R., pp.50-58.)
While the sentencing hearing was pending, Mr. Williston filed a motion to withdraw his

At the hearing on Mr. Williston's motion to withdraw his guilty plea, the district court
relied on a rough transcript of the arraignment/entry of plea hearing. (03/24/14
Tr., p.30, Ls.4-12.) A formal transcript of the arraignment/entry of plea hearing was
created for the record on appeal. While there are some minor discrepancies between
the two transcripts, none of those discrepancies are material. As such, all citations in
this brief will be to the formal transcript created for the record on appeal.
2 During one of the hearings where a continuance was requested, Mr. Williston
indicated that he read the presentence investigation. (R., p.58.)
1

2

guilty plea and a supporting memorandum. 3 (R., pp.61-62, 68-70.) A hearing was held
on the motion, wherein Mr. Williston argued, among other things, that he was not
informed that attempted strangulation had an intent element, and that he did not have
the requisite intent to be found guilty of that offense. (03/24/14 Tr., p.32, Ls.11-17, p.33,
L.24 - p.34, L.12, p.37, L.20 - p.38, L.7.) Mr. Williston testified that his attorney told him
that to be found guilty of attempted strangulation, the State was only required to prove
that he touched his wife's neck. (03/24/14 Tr., p.32, Ls.11-17, p.33, L.24 - p.34, L.12,
p.37, L.20 - p.38, L. 7.) The district court denied Mr. Williston's motion to withdraw his
guilty plea, reasoning that the language in the information and the district court's
recitation of that language at the arraignment/entry of plea hearing put him on notice
that attempted strangulation had an intent element. (R., pp.79-80.)
Thereafter, the district court imposed a unified sentence of twelve years, with
eight years fixed. (R., pp.88-90.) Mr. Williston timely appealed. (R., pp.91-93.)

The State filed a memorandum in opposition to Mr. Williston's motion to withdraw his
guilty plea. (03/24/14 Tr., p.29, L.25 - p.30, L.3.) However, the State's memorandum in
opposition to Mr. Williston's motion to withdraw his guilty plea is currently not in the
record on appeal. Accordingly, a motion to augment has been filed concurrently
herewith.
3

3

ISSUE
Did the district court abuse its discretion when it denied Mr. Williston's motion to
withdraw his guilty plea?

4

ARGUMENT
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Denied Mr. Williston's Motion To
Withdraw His Guilty Plea
A.

Introduction
The district court abused its discretion when it denied Mr. Williston's motion to

withdraw his guilty plea because he was never informed about the intent element of
attempted strangulation and the district court's recitation of a portion of the information
at the arraignment/entry of plea hearing did not apprise Mr. Williston of that element.
Moreover, the district court's ruling on that issue did not even address the uncontested
fact that Mr. Williston was erroneously informed that attempted strangulation did not
have an intent element. As such, Mr. Williston's guilty plea was not entered knowingly,
intelligently, and voluntarily. Even if this Court finds that Mr. Williston's guiity plea was
entered knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily, Mr. Williston provided a just reason to
withdraw his guilty plea and the State never alleged that it would be prejudiced in the
event the district court allowed Mr. Williston to withdraw his guilty plea.

B.

Standard Of Review
Appellate review of the denial of a motion to withdraw a guilty plea is limited to

determining whether the court exercised sound judicial discretion as distinguished from
arbitrary action.

State v. Freeman, 110 Idaho 117, 121 (Ct. App. 1986).

Idaho

appellate courts conduct a multi-tiered inquiry when an exercise of discretion is
reviewed on appeal. State v. Hedger, 115 Idaho 598, 600 (1989). The sequence of the
inquiry is: (1) whether the lower court rightly perceived the issue as one of discretion;
(2) whether the court acted within the outer boundaries of such discretion and

5

consistently with any legal standards applicable to specific choices; and (3) whether the
cowi reached its decision by an exercise of reason. Id.
When a defendant moves to withdraw a guilty plea prior to sentencing, the
court's discretion should be liberally exercised. State v. Hanslovan, 147 Idaho 530, 535
{Ct. App. 2008). "However, when a motion to withdraw a guilty plea is made before
sentencing but after the movant has read his presentence report or received other
information about his probable sentence, the court is to exercise broad discretion, but
may temper its liberality by weighing the defendant's apparent motive."

State v.

Johnson, 120 Idaho 408,411 (Ct. App. 1991).

C.

The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Denied Mr. Wiiliston's Motion To
\J\/ithdraw His Guilty Plea Because He Was Not Informed About The Requisite
Intent Element Of Attempted Strangulation Prior To The Entry Of His Guiltv Plea
Idaho Criminal Rule 33(c) provides: "A motion to withdraw a plea of guilty may be

made only before sentence is imposed or imposition of sentence is suspended; but to
correct manifest injustice the court after sentence may set aside the judgment of
conviction and permit the defendant to withdraw defendant's plea." When evaluating a
motion to withdraw a guilty plea made prior to sentencing, the district court must first
consider whether the guilty plea was entered knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily.

Hanslovan, 147 Idaho at 536.

Due process protections require a court to allow a

defendant to withdraw a guilty plea if the court determines that the guilty plea was not
entered knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily.

Id.

An appellate court looks at the

record as a whole when determining whether a guilty plea was entered knowingly,
intelligently, and voluntarily. State v. Carrasco, 117 Idaho 295,300 (1990).
In the event this Court determines that the guilty plea met the foregoing
constitutional standards, "the defendant has the burden of showing [that] a 'just reason'
6

exists to withdraw the plea." Hanslovan, 147 Idaho at 535. "This just reason standard
does not require that the defendant establish a constitutional defect in the guilty plea."
Id. at 536. "When such a reason is presented, relief will be granted absent a strong
showing of prejudice by the state." Johnson, 120 Idaho at 411.
Mr. Williston's guilty plea was not entered knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily,
because he was not aware of the applicable intent element of attempted strangulation at
the time he entered his guilty plea.

"In order for a guilty plea to be voluntary, a

defendant must be informed of the intent elements requisite to the charged offense."
Sparrow v. State, 102 Idaho 60, 61 (1981); see also State v. Henderson, 113 Idaho 411,
412 (Ct App. 1987) ("A voluntary plea cannot be made without disclosure to the
accused of the intent element of a specific intent crime.").
Attempted strangulation has an intent element.

The relevant portions of the

attempted strangulation statute follow:
(1) Any person who willfully and unlawfully chokes or attempts to strangle
a household member, or a person with whom he or she has or had a
dating relationship, is guilty of a felony punishable by incarceration for up
to fifteen (15) years in the state prison.
(2) No injuries are required to prove attempted strangulation.
(3) The prosecution is not required to show that the defendant intended to
kill or injure the victim. The only intent required is the intent to choke or
attempt to strangle.
I.C. § 18-923 (emphasis added). The Court of Appeals provided an explanation of the
foregoing statute in State v. Laramore, 145 Idaho 428 (Ct. App. 2008), where it
addressed a claim that I.C. § 18-923 was unconstitutionally vague.

As part of its

analysis, the Court of Appeals held that, "one could not attempt to strangle an individual
without intending to injure." Id. at 431-432. The Court of Appeals then held:

7

The same is not true of the "choke" component of the offense, however.
Commonly, choke means "to make normal breathing difficult or impossible
... by compressing the throat with strong external pressure." WEBSTER'S
THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARYY [at 396 (1976)]. V\/ith this
meaning, choking an individual generally would entail an intent to at least
make the person temporarily uncomfortable or fearful, but it could be done
without an intent to inflict a physical injury.

lei. at 432. As such, attempted strangulation has an intent element which requires the
State to prove that a defendant intended to make the victim fearful or uncomfortable
while the defendant was compressing h throat with strong external pressure. Moreover,
since attempted strangulation is an attempt crime, the State must prove the defendant
intended to commit the underlying offense.

See State v. Crowe, 135 Idaho 43, 46

(Ct. App. 2000) ("[G]uilt of 'attempt' crimes requires intent to commit the 'attempted'
offense."); see also State v. Pratt, 125 Idaho 546, 558 (1993) ("[T]here is ... the crime of
attempt to commit a crime, in which case the state bears the burden of proving that the
defendant intended to commit the crime.") (original emphasis).
Mr. Williston was never informed about the specific intent element contained in
I.C. § 18-923 prior to the entry of his guilty plea. According to Mr. Williston:
At the time I made my plea, I had a different attorney from the
public defender's office. . . . And I had made mention to her that at no
time did I strangle my wife or attempt to strangle my wife or have the willful
intent to do so. And she said just by placing my hands on her neck in
itself was [attempted] strangulation.!41

[S]he said if you touched your wife by her neck then that is [attempted]
strangulation.

By asserting that he relied on any inaccurate statements or misrepresentations of the
law by his counsel, Mr. Williston does not assert any claim of ineffective assistance of
counsel herein, but chooses to reserve any such claim for any future petition for postconviction relief, should one be forthcoming. See Matthews v. State, 122 Idaho 801,
806 (1992) (defendant may raise claims of ineffective assistance of counsel either on
direct appeal or through a petition for post-conviction relief, but not both).
4
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It's my contention that I wasn't given all the factual information in
regards to what constitutes strangulation. If I would have known and [my
attorney] would have made [me aware] that you willfully have to have the
intent to squeeze someone's neck and cause them not to breathe then I
wouldn't be guilty of that; I haven't done that.
(03/24/14 Tr., p.32, Ls.11-17, p.33, L.24 - p.34, L.1, p.34, Ls.6-12.) Mr. Williston went
on to testify as follows:
I did enter a guilty plea to attempted strangulation, I did do that
But I felt coerced because of the lack of information ... I was not able to
give a true plea because I was unaware of what [attempted] strangulation
truly was.
[Attempted strangulation] is not just touching someone by their
neck or shaking them by their pony tail or by their head. It's trying to cut
their breath off. And at no time did I do that.
(03/24/14 Tr., p.37, L.23 - p.38, L.7.) As such, Mr. VVilliston was erroneously informed
about the requisite intent element of attempted strangulation.
The district court's determination that Mr. Williston was aware of the intent
element of attempted strangulation is not supported by the record. The district court's
ruling follows:
It is important to note that the Attempted Strangulation charge
accused the Defendant of "choking" or attempting to strangle the alleged
victim by "wrapping his hand(s) around the victim's throat and
squeezing[.]" At one point in the plea colloquy when Mr. Williston was
asked if he needed more time with his attorney, he responded by saying
there was nothing for him to discuss (with his lawyer), that he was not
denying this allegation . . . that would be completely ludicrous (Ex. 1,
pp.11-12). This Court infers that Mr. Williston had read the allegation in
Count I because he stated he would prefer not to hear the accusation read
aloud when the Court offered to do so (Ex. 1, pp.10-11 ). At another stage
in the proceeding[,] the Court specifically advised Defendant that Count 1
alleged that he choked or attempted to strangle Sheri Williston and asked
if that was true. Defendant answered, "Yes, sir." (Ex.1, pp.15-16.)

(R., pp.79-80.)

9

The fundamental problem with the district court's ruling is that there is nothing in
the record which contradicts Mr. Williston's testimony that he was told that attempted
strangulation only requires the general intent to touch a person's neck. Moreover, the
language in the information only described the actus reus elements and status elements
of attempted strangulation. Merely reading the information did not inform Mr. Williston
about the intent element of the offense and that certainly did not contradict his
misunderstanding of the intent element of attempted strangulation.
Support for Mr. Williston's position can be found in State v. Henderson, 113
Idaho 411 (Ct. App. 1987). In that case, Henderson was charged with grand theft for
his attempt to purchase silver with forged cashier's checks. Id. at. 411. After entering a
guilty plea to grand theft, Mr. Henderson moved to withdraw his plea. Id. The district
court denied his motion and on appeal he argued that "prior to the acceptance of his
guilty plea, the court failed to adequately inform him of the intent element requisite to
the crime of theft." Id.
In reversing the district court, the Court of Appeals first addressed various factors
present in the record. The Court of Appeals first pointed out that the information was
read to Mr. Henderson at the arraignment hearing and it charged him with having
willfully "unlawfully and feloniously, pursuant to a scheme to defraud, obtained property
of the Sunshine Mining Company ... by falsely representing that certain checks ...
were legitimate Cashier's Checks when in fact said Cashier's Checks were false and
forged."

Id. at 412.

When asked if he understood those words, Henderson replied

"Yes." Id. Approximately four months later, at the change of plea hearing, the district
court told Henderson, "You are admitting the truth of the matter set forth in the
Information, including intent, and you would be admitting that you are guilty of the crime

10

charged."

Id.

(emphasis added).

The Court of Appeals then held that the only

explanation Henderson had received about the elements of grand theft came from the
reading of the information. Id. The Court of Appeals also held:
The information itself did not specifically mention an intent to
deprive or an intent to defraud. It did not allege that Henderson knew or
had reason to know that the cashier's checks were false and forged and
would not be paid when presented. Nothing in the record shows that,
when the guilty plea was entered, Henderson had been told that if the
case went to trial the state would have to prove the specific intent and
knowledge required for a conviction under this statute. What Henderson's
trial counsel may have told Henderson about elements of proof or possible
defenses is not shown.
Id. at 412-413. 5
Based on the foregoing, the district court indicated that, "We are forced to say
that [these allegations] leave room for doubt about the voluntariness of Henderson's
guilty plea. However, we do not need to decide that issue." Id. at 413. The Court of
Appeals then pointed out that Henderson moved to withdraw his plea prior to
sentencing and that the State never asserted that it would suffer any prejudice if the
district court allowed Henderson to withdraw his guilty plea. Id. at 413-414. The Court
of Appeals ultimately held that "where, as here, a fair and just reason for withdrawing
the plea has been presented, and no prejudice to the state has been shown, the
defendant is entitled to liberal allowance of his request for a trial." Id. at 414.
This matter is substantially similar to Henderson and, as such, the district court
abused its discretion when it denied Mr. Williston's motion to withdraw his guilty plea.
Mr. Williston waived his preliminary hearing without an attorney and there was no
discussion of the charged offense.

(R., pp.29-30.) Mr. Williston pleaded guilty at his

5

Henderson also asserted that his attorney never informed him that he had to know that
the checks were "bad" at the time he passed them and that, in fact, he did not know
they were "bad" checks when he passed them. Id. at 413.
11

arraignment and waived the reading of the information. (R., p.40.) Mr. Williston met his
attorney the same day he pleaded guilty and spent approximately five minutes with his
attorney before he pleaded guilty. 6 (03/24/14 Tr., p.33, Ls.3-21, p.18, L.19 - p.20, L.4.)
Again, Mr. vVi!liston waived a reading of the information at the arraignmenUentry of plea
hearing. (R., p.40.) At the arraignmenUentry of plea hearing, the intent element was
not explained to Mr. Williston and when he was first asked how he was going to plead
the district court recited the date of the alleged offense, the maximum penalties, and
used the phrase attempted strangulation.

(10/04/13 Tr., p.17, Ls.14-19.)

After

Mr. Williston was sworn, the district court told Mr. Williston that the information stated he
"willfully and unlawfully choked or attempted to strangle a person . . . . "

(10/04/13

Tr., p.20, Ls.5-9.) The district court then stated "but the important part is that it says that
you were household members at the time of this action." (10/04/13 Tr., p.20, Ls.12-15.)
As was the case in Henderson, Mr. Williston was not informed about the intent element
of attempted strangulation at the arraignment/entry of plea hearing.

Moreover, the

district court emphasized that the important element of the offense was that
Mr. Williston and Ms. Williston were household members at the time of the offense.
Additionally, the information in this matter is similar to the information in

Henderson as neither of them contained a description of the requisite intent elements of
the respective offenses. The information in this matter provides, "The Defendant ... did

6

On appeal, Mr. Williston is not asserting that this short period of time to speak with his
attorney constitutes an independent reason why his guilty plea was not entered
knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily, as the district court was aware that Mr. Williston
had just met his attorney the day he entered his guilty plea (10/04/13 Tr., p.15, L.22 p.17, L.2) and provided Mr. Williston multiple opportunities to seek a continuance in
order to have time to speak with his attorney. However, it is a factor to consider when
determining whether he was adequately informed about the intent element of attempted
strangulation.
12

willfully and unlawfully choke or attempt to strangle the person of Sheri VVilliston, to-wit:
by wrapping his hand or hands around the victim's throat and squeezing, and where
Sheri Williston and the Defendant are household members."

(R., pp.34-35.)

The

information in Henderson provided that Henderson "[willfully] unlawfully and feloniously,
pursuant to a scheme to defraud, obtained property of the Sunshine Mining
Company . . . by falsely representing that certain checks ... were legitimate Cashier's
Checks when in fact said Cashier's Checks were false and forged." Id. at 412. Both of
these informations left out the mental intent element of the offenses and they only
focused on the actus reus elements of the offenses.
Further, the factors surrounding Mr. Williston's guilty plea provide a more
compelling case than those in Henderson for the allowance of withdrawal. In
Henderson, the district court did not explain the intent element of grand theft, but did tell
Henderson there was an intent element. Henderson, 113 Idaho at 412. In this matter,
intent was never addressed at the arraignment/entry of plea hearing and, as mentioned
above, the district court emphasized the domestic relationship element of attempted
strangulation. In Henderson, Henderson was never informed by his attorney that grand
theft had an intent element. Id. at 413. In this matter, Mr. Williston was affirmatively
misled about the intent element of attempted strangulation. (03/24/14 Tr., p.32, Ls.1117, p.33, L.24 - p.34, L.12, p.37, L.20 - p.38. L. 7.)
Mr. Williston's claim is also supported by the fact that the district court failed to
request a factual basis for his guilty plea. After Mr. Williston was, the district court first
asked him to look at Count I of the information and said, "It alleges the that on August
29th of 2013 here in Kootenai County, it says that you willfully and unlawfully choked or
attempted to strangle a person by the name of Sheri Williston.
13

Is all of that true?"

(10/04/13 Tr., p.20, Ls.5-9.) Mr. Williston said yes. (10/04/13 Tr., p.20, L.11.) Instead
of requesting a factual basis for the guilty plea, the district court then said, the
information "describes how you did that -~ and I'm not sure we need to go over that -but the important part is that it says that you were household members at the time of
this action.

!s that true as well?"

(10/04/13 Tr., p.20, Ls.12-16 (emphasis added).)

Mr. Williston said that is true, and the district court accepted Mr. Williston's guilty plea.

(10/04/13 Tr., p.20, Ls.18-22.)

Had the district court asked Mr. Williston the actual

means by which he attempted to strangle Ms. Williston, it might have discovered that he
did not understand that attempted strangulation requires more than mere touching of
the victim's neck. See State v. Hoffman, 108 Idaho 720, 722 (Ct. App. 1985) ("[T]he
object of ascertaining a factual basis is to assure that the defendant's plea is made
knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily.").
In the event that this Court determines Mr. Williston's plea agreement was
entered knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily, he argues, in the alternative, that he
provided a just reason in support of his motion to withdraw his guilty plea.

As

mentioned above, the Henderson Court did not make a determination on the question of
whether Henderson's guilty plea was entered knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily,
because it held that Henderson provided a just reason to withdraw the guilty plea and
the State did not assert that it would be prejudiced if Henderson withdrew his guilty plea.

Henderson, 113 Idaho at 413. In this case, Mr. Williston provided the same justification
for withdrawing his guilty plea and the factors surrounding his guilty plea provided a
more compelling case for the allowance of withdrawal than those present in Henderson.
As in Henderson, the State, in this matter, did not assert that it would be prejudiced if
Mr. Williston withdrew his guilty plea. (See generally, 03/24/14 Tr; State's Response to
14

Defendant's Motion to Withdraw Guilty Plea, pp.1-4.) As such, Mr. Williston should
have been to allowed to withdraw his guilty plea because he provided a just reason for
withdrawal of his plea and the State would not have been prejudiced if he was allowed
to withdraw his guilty plea.
In sum, it has been well established in Idaho that a defendant must be informed
about the intent element of an offense in order for a guilty plea to be deemed entered
knowingly, inteiligently, and voluntarily. Attempted strangulation has an intent element
and Mr. Williston was not informed about that element prior to the entry of his guilty
plea.

In fact, Mr. Williston was affirmatively misled when he was told the attempted

strangulation had no intent element. Even if this Court holds that Mr. Williston's guilty
plea did meet constitutional muster, he provided a just reason to withdraw his plea and
the State did not assert that it would be prejudiced in the event Mr. Williston was
allowed to withdraw his plea. As such, the district court abused its discretion when it
denied Mr. Williston's motion to withdraw his guilty plea.

CONCLUSION
Mr. Williston respectfully requests that this Court reverse the district court's order
denying his motion to withdraw his guilty plea and remand this matter for further
proceedings.
DATED this 2?1h day of January, 2015.

SHAWN F. WILKERSON
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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